August 19, 2026
Published in Canada's National Observer, September 1, 2026
By Mark Winfield
Recent revelations have indicated that the estimated costs of the Ontario line subway project in Toronto have more than tripled relative to the original estimates, to over $34 billion, with further cost increases likely. The situation again raises questions about how these kinds of megaprojects are being planned, managed and financed.
Whatever the final costs of the Ontario line turn out to be, it is important to recall that the project only represents the small portion of what is now a more than half-trillion dollar infrastructure spending program being pursued by the Ford government. The key elements of the program include a massive expansion of the role of nuclear power (with costs estimated in excess of $400 billion), highway expansion ($30 billion plus $50-100 billion for burying the 401 highway) and transit projects ($70 billion (not counting the revised Ontario Line cost estimates)) projects.
There is no doubt the province needs to make investments in energy, transportation and other infrastructures. But whether the specific projects the province is pursuing make economic, technological, environmental and planning sense, whether the resulting projects are being well managed, and how they are to be paid for, are different sets of questions.
None of the projects in the Ford government’s growing portfolio of infrastructure megaprojects has been subject to any meaningful form of public assessment or review. That situation has been reinforced by the Ford government’s ‘streamlining’ of the province’s environmental assessment process to the point of meaninglessness. Many of the key projects, like the 413 Highway, 404-400 Highway Bradford By-Pass and the Pickering B nuclear plant refurbishment, have been previously assessed as unnecessary and uneconomic.
The Ontario Line is a prominent example of this pattern. There has never been a serious rationale presented for how the long-planned Pape to Queen station downtown relief subway line in Toronto, morphed into the $34+ billion Ontario Line megaproject running from the now discarded Science Centre to the long-closed and partially demolished Ontario Place. Instead, the provincial transit agency Metrolinx, has been granted authority to effectively approve its own projects, under direction from the province. Canada’s Transportation Safety Board, for its part, recently came to the realization that there is no effective independent safety oversight of Metrolinx’s rail operations.
At a more local level, as the many communities affected by Metrolinx’s projects have found out, the arrangements have left no independent body to whom complaints or concerns about the more direct impacts of the agency’s activities can be addressed.
The question of how these megaprojects are being managed also has to be considered. The delays and cost overruns on provincial transit projects, like the Eglinton and Mississauga LRT projects, and the risks of similar outcomes with the Ontario line project, have drawn attention to the near-complete lack of meaningful oversight and transparency around Metrolinx’s activities. The province’s handling of the refurbishment of Ontario Place, and construction of a private spa on part of the site, has raised similar questions about a lack of adequate oversight, review and assessment.
Finally, there is the question of how this portfolio of projects is to be paid for. This has been an area of ambiguity, if not mystery. The long-term implications of whatever financing arrangements are being made for the province’s overall fiscal position need to be fully understood and evaluated carefully. We are no longer in an age when governments can effectively borrow at near-zero interest rates.
The province has increasingly emphasized, under its ‘Protect Ontario’ banner, the commitment of its fiscal capacity to very-long-term infrastructure megaprojects in a period of high economic and political uncertainty. The choices being made are particularly important when the province is widely seen to be chronically underspending in areas with long-term implications for the province’s long-term well-being of their own, like education (at all levels) and health care.
Provincial investments in energy, transportation and other infrastructures are essential. But the public needs to be sure that these investments make sense in economic, environmental, and social terms. The current process is failing to deliver on all of these fronts.
In the case of transit projects like the Ontario Line, effective independent and transparent regulatory oversight of the province’s transit planning and development process is needed. Such an arrangement could provide a defense against the politization of decision-making, by requiring that there be demonstrable transportation, planning, economic, and environmental rationales for projects before they proceed. A framework is also needed for the independent adjudication and resolution of conflicts over the impacts of transit construction on the affected communities.
The province’s current, non-transparent approach to decision-making and the management of infrastructure megaprojects begs questions about whether Ontario is laying the groundwork for a series of white elephants. The resulting costs and impacts may haunt Ontario residents for decades, if not centuries, to come.
Mark Winfield is a Professor of Environmental and Urban Change at York University in Toronto.
